Shifting Opinions: Experiments on Agreement and Disagreement in Dialogue by Concannon, S et al.
Shifting Opinions: An Experiment on Agreement and Disagreement in
Dialogue
Shauna Concannon Patrick G. T. Healey
Queen Mary University of London
Cognitive Science Research Group
School of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science
s.concannon@qmul.ac.uk
Matthew Purver
Abstract
Disagreement is understood to be socially
problematic; it also rarely surfaces in nat-
urally occurring conversation. An exper-
iment was designed to allow us to di-
rectly manipulate the occurrence of ex-
posed (dis)agreement and track its ef-
fects on the subsequent dialogue. This
is the first experiment to directly manip-
ulate the occurrence of exposed agree-
ment and disagreement in dialogue. In-
sertions of exposed disagreement disrupt
dialogues, bringing the topic of disagree-
ment directly into the conversation, pro-
voking clarification requests and result-
ing in a greater number of self-edits when
formulating turns. The insertion of dis-
agreement also led to more instances of
exposed agreement, suggesting that dia-
logue partners co-operate to redress the
face-threat of disagreement. Conversely,
exposed agreement insertions were not as
incongruous and had less disruptive im-
pact on the ensuing dialogues; however,
introducing agreement into the dialogue
did lead to greater deliberation, with more
alternative scenarios considered by partic-
ipants during the task.
1 Introduction
Disagreeing or expressing a view in opposition
to that of your interlocutor can be socially prob-
lematic. Disagreement has been associated with
confrontation and conflict. Brown and Levinson
(1987), in their seminal work on politeness, ex-
plain the predisposition for the avoidance of dis-
agreement in terms of face, the concept derived
from Goffman, relating to the public self-image or
identity of an individual in interaction with others
(Goffman, 1967). Direct challenges to a speaker
or disagreeing with their assertion in dialogue can
constitute, in Brown and Levinson’s terminology,
what is known as a Face Threatening Act, that is to
say it can threaten the hearer’s public self-image.
Conversation Analysts have shown that when
people produce assessments of situations or
events, positive responses are made more quickly
and clearly than negative or unaligned responses
(Sacks, 1987; Pomerantz, 1977). Negative or dis-
preferred responses are normally produced more
slowly and are often prefaced with some form of
agreement (e.g. ‘Oh yes... but’) and the nega-
tive assessment itself is often delayed by several
turns and produced with some sort of mitigating
account (Pomerantz, 1977). Disagreement, espe-
cially when done in a direct manner, is rare in con-
versation (Concannon et al., 2015). This means
that it is difficult to assess what effects it has upon
a dialogue. An experimental approach has the ad-
vantage that it allows us to directly manipulate the
occurrence of exposed (dis)agreement and track its
effects on the subsequent dialogue.
Previous studies on disagreement take a distri-
butional or corpus based approach at evidencing
and analysing instances of disagreement in inter-
action (Walker et al., 2012; Abbott et al., 2011;
Misra and Walker, 2013; Holtgraves, 1997). These
studies have provided valuable insights into the
ways in which these complex social interactions
are handled in different contexts, and given rise
to various theories on how we process, respond to
and mitigate the impact of disagreement. How-
ever, the literature also highlights that exposed dis-
agreement rarely surfaces in naturally occurring
conversation (Pomerantz, 1977; Concannon et al.,
2015).
This paper outlines an experimental approach
for investigating disagreement, which provides
opportunity to manipulate the occurrence of ex-
posed (dis)agreement in dialogue. By exposed, we
refer particularly to direct and unequivocal presen-
tations of agreement and disagreement, such as ‘I
agree’ and ‘You’re wrong’. However, we also ex-
plore less direct markers, which can, but do not
always function in a (dis)agreement capacity. For
example, turn initial ‘no’ and ‘yes’, can and are
often used to signal agreement and disagreement,
however, the function of these markers is context
specific and depends on the preceding content (for
example a ‘no’ following a negative statement can
function as agreement).
1.1 Politeness and Accommodation Theory
One argument for the scarcity of disagreement in
dialogue is anchored to the concept of politeness.
Politeness Theory builds upon Ervin Goffman’s
concept of face. Goffman (1967) defines face
as ‘the positive social value a person effectively
claims for himself’ through interaction and offers
a model of co-operation that is enacted when an
individual’s face or social value is threatened dur-
ing interaction. Goffman stresses the co-operative
nature of facework: ‘When a face has been threat-
ened ... lack of effort on the part of one person in-
duces compensative effort from others’ (Goffman,
1967). This mutual co-operation and shared con-
sideration in interaction has also been located as a
central notion for Politeness Theorists (Brown and
Levinson, 1987; Watts, 2003).
Politeness Theory suggests that interlocutors
minimise disagreement to save face, employing
strategic conflict avoidance techniques to mitigate
the effect of any disagreement that may surface
(Leech, 1980). However, Accommodation The-
ory would posit that if someone is agreeable their
conversational partner would match them in this
convivial approach, whereas if they are adopting
a discursive or even combative linguistic style,
then their conversational partner would be likely
to adopt a similar tact and synchronicity would be-
come more exaggerated (Giles and Smith, 1979).
Accommodation Theory posits that interlocutors
adopt strategies of convergence to integrate and
identify socially with another (Giles et al., 1991);
this involves the adoption of linguistic similari-
ties and leads to perceived communicative effec-
tiveness (Giles and Smith, 1979) and cooperative-
ness (Feldman, 1968). Conversely, speech diver-
gence reflects distancing from the co-conversant
and can surface when confronted with perceived
differences to the co-conversant.
1.2 Polite disagreement: When the context is
right
Recent literature on disagreement and politeness
theory in Sociolinguistics and Conversation Anal-
ysis suggests that in certain contexts disagree-
ment is appropriate (Kotthoff, 1993), can signal
sociability and intimacy (Schiffrin, 1984; Tan-
nen, 1984; Angouri and Tseliga, 2010), and rather
than lead to conflict, help strengthen relationships
(Georgakopoulou, 2001; Sifianou, 2012). Fur-
thermore, Chiu (2008) found in problem solving
dialogues that disagreement, when done politely,
was more productive in provoking novel contri-
butions from participants than agreement. So al-
though disagreement, particularly when executed
impolitely, tends to be problematic, for certain
contexts, such as problem solving and discussion
tasks, it may be essential in advancing the deliber-
ative quality of a dialogue. Chiu (2008) also sug-
gests that agreement can be potentially detrimen-
tal to a dialogue, but the problematic aspects of
agreement are not well reported in the literature;
this gives rise to the question, ‘what effect does
exposed agreement have upon a dialogue?’ If it is
problematic, how and in what ways does this man-
ifest?
If disagreement encourages novel contributions
does agreement, conversely, stifle them? If people
are too readily agreeing, does this prevent more in-
volved discussion that could lead to shifts in stance
or the development of new contributions? In order
to understand the effects of both exposed agree-
ment and disagreement, an experiment was de-
signed that enabled the manipulation of such fea-
tures under controlled conditions.
1.2.1 Can disagreement lead to more
considered discussion?
A motivating factor behind this research is an in-
terest in how individuals are led to shifts in stance,
and how and when this occurs through interac-
tion. Although there is good reason to think that
disagreement ought to be socially problematic, as
well as the insights provided by Chiu (2008), re-
search on the phenomenon of repair shows that
disruption in interaction can also be potentially
beneficial to the progression of a dialogue (Healey,
2008; Colman et al., 2011), particularly if focused
on the clarification of a content issue. Although
instances of repair seemingly interrupt the flow
of a dialogue, this attempt to address problem-
atic talk is not necessarily negative, rather it seems
to drive the conversation forward. Issuing only
agreements can often lead to a lack of mutual intel-
ligibility in fact, which is why instances of repair
are so common in task-oriented dialogues (Col-
man et al., 2011), a context where effective co-
ordination is critical to the interactional outcome.
Healey (2008) demonstrates that repair processes
deal directly with misalignments and have a pos-
itive effect on measures of interactional outcome.
Consequently, disagreement ought to be a catalyst
or precursor to a potential shift in stance, as it sig-
nals a direct challenge to a held idea, which in
turn may be retained, re-negotiated or or more fun-
damentally re-conceived. This, together with the
findings by Chiu (2008), suggests that disagree-
ment can play an important role in the deliberation
and problem solving process.
1.3 Predictions
Given the literature we would expect that exposed
disagreement would be especially problematic; it
should instigate additional work being done in the
interaction and more instances of repair. Inser-
tions of exposed disagreement should be more dis-
ruptive than exposed agreement insertions, which
should in turn facilitate more agreement. Assum-
ing speakers are being co-operative, all things be-
ing equal, then disagreement should lead to more
hedging and mitigation in order to manage the dis-
agreement and minimise face threat. However, it
may also lead to additional shifts in stance, or the
consideration of more alternatives during the dis-
cussion dialogues.
2 Agreement and Disagreement
Fragment Experiment
In order to assess the impact of exposed
(dis)agreement, an experiment was designed in
which instances of exposed (dis)agreement were
artificially inserted into a dialogue. Turn-initial
discourse markers such as ‘No’, ‘But’ ‘You’re
wrong’ and, ‘I disagree’ can highlight instances
of disagreement within a conversation. Similarly,
‘Yes’, ‘And’, ‘I agree’ and ‘You’re right’ can serve
as indicators of agreement, or reinforce congru-
ence. These eight fragments were selected be-
cause they provide a range of exposed, direct
(dis)agreement and more subtle markers that can
be used in (dis)agreement.
2.1 Hypotheses
1. Accommodation Theory: The general ac-
commodation hypothesis is that dialogue
partners match linguistic and discursive style.
Thus the general accommodation hypothe-
sis predicts that the insertion of agreement
fragments will elicit additional instances of
agreement, while the insertion of disagree-
ment fragments will elicit additional in-
stances of disagreement.
2. Politeness: The general politeness hypothe-
sis is that face-threatening acts are socially
problematic and should result in compen-
satory action being taken to redress and mit-
igate the situation. The general politeness
hypothesis thus predicts that inserting dis-
agreement fragments into a dialogue should
lead to more work being done and more co-
operation and consideration being displayed;
this may result in increased effort when for-
mulating responses (higher number of self-
edits) and more clarification requests, expres-
sions of agreement and other routinised polite
sequences.
3. Productive Disagreements: The general pro-
ductive disagreement hypothesis is that dis-
agreement is essential for advancing the de-
liberative quality and problem solving as-
pects of dialogue. The productive disagree-
ment hypothesis thus predicts that people will
respond constructively to disagreement. The
specific predictions for particular response
measures are a much lower level issue, but
we would expect the insertion of disagree-
ment fragments to lead to increased delibera-
tion taking place which lead to a higher num-
ber of shifts in stance over the course of a
dialogue.
2.2 Method
Pairs of participants were seated at separate com-
puters in adjacent rooms and given an instruction
sheet to read detailing the balloon task. Partic-
ipants are presented with a fictional scenario in
which an hot air balloon is losing altitude and
about to crash. The only way for any of three pas-
sengers to survive is for one of them to jump to a
certain death. The three passengers are: Dr. Nick
Riviera, a cancer scientist, Mrs. Susie Derkins,
a pregnant primary school teacher, and Mr. Tom
Derkins, the balloon pilot and Susies husband.
Participants are told to take as much time as they
need to read the summary of the situation and then
discuss with their partners via a chat tool set up
on the computer at which they are seated, and at-
tempt to come to a conclusion over who should
jump from the balloon. The advantages of this
task are that it is effective at generating debates be-
tween subjects and involves articulations of agree-
ment and disagreement as they attempt to come to
a conclusion. There is also plenty of scope for de-
liberation and shifts in stance.
2.3 Participants
Seventy-two participants were recruited, 46 fe-
male and 26 male, with the majority being under-
graduate and postgraduate students at the Univer-
sity of London. Participants were invited to attend
with someone who they already knew. They were
recruited in pairs to ensure that inter-pair partic-
ipants were acquainted. For a couple of experi-
ments if one participant didn’t show up a stand in
was recruited last minute, and in these exceptions,
which are marked in the data, the pair were not
previously acquainted with each other. Each par-
ticipant was paid at a rate of £7.50 per hour for
participating in the experiment, or if they were a
Psychology student at Queen Mary University of
London then they could receive course credits in
lieu of payment.
2.4 Materials
The participants communicate via a specially pro-
grammed chat tool, similar to other instant mes-
senger interfaces they may have used previously.
The Dialogue Experimental Toolkit (DiET) chat
tool is a text-based chat interface facilitating real
time manipulations of the dialogue. It is possible
to programme several different types of interven-
tions using the chat tool: turns may be altered prior
to transmission, turns may not be relayed, and ad-
ditional turns may be added, (e.g. Healey et al.
(2003), insertion of spoof clarification requests).
These manipulations occur as the dialogue pro-
gresses, thus making them minimally disruptive
to the sequence of dialogue. The DiET chat tool
is built in Java and consists of a server console
and user interface. Participants are faced with a
text box displaying the conversation history and a
smaller text box into which they can type. Partici-
pants can type simultaneously and their message is
relayed to their conversation partner by use of the
ENTER key. The server time stamps and stores
all key presses. All turns are passed to the server
before being transmitted to the other participant,
thus making it an intermediary between what the
participants type and what they receive. Turns can
be automatically altered, removed or inserted by
the server before they are relayed.
2.5 Design
The experiment is conducted in pairs; there were
12 dyads for each condition. Pairs of partici-
pants were presented with a discussion task and
instructed to discuss for 30 minutes and attempt
to come to an agreement. Each pair of participants
was assigned to a condition at random. There were
three experimental conditions. Please note, what
we gloss here as the Agreement and Disagreement
conditions, are named as such because the inserted
fragments in each condition can index disagree-
ment, however, we recognise that the more in-
direct fragments do not consistently perform this
function.
• Control condition: Participants are wel-
comed and briefed before being sat at their
respective computers, which were situated in
adjoining rooms. They receive their task in-
structions on a piece of paper and can start
when they are ready. They are instructed to
discuss the scenario and attempt to come to
an agreement on who should jump from the
balloon for 30 minutes. No interventions are
performed by the server; participants receive
the dialogue turns exactly as they were typed.
• Agreement condition: Initial procedure is
exactly the same as the control condition.
Participants receive the dialogue turns ex-
actly as they were typed, except for every
fourth turn when one of the following frag-
ments is inserted position: you’re right, I
agree, yes, and.
• Disagreement condition: Initial procedure
is exactly the same as the control condition.
Participants receive the dialogue turns ex-
actly as they were typed, except for every
fourth turn when one of the following frag-
ments inserted at turn-initial position: you’re
wrong, I disagree, no, but.
A small scale pilot study raised some design im-
plications that were accordingly addressed. In the
Agreement and Disagreement conditions manipu-
lations were carried out every fourth turn issued by
each speaker as this was deemed an acceptable fre-
quency for interventions without proving too dis-
ruptive to the conversation. No intervention was
made if the turn consisted of only one word, or
the turn started with the same text as featured in
the insertion fragments. This was to avoid the pro-
duction of particularly non-sensical turns such as
you’re wrong I agree. The fragments were cycled
through in order but the exposed (dis)agreement
fragments (you’re wrong/right, I (dis)agree) ap-
peared half as often due to their marked nature.
3 Results
Data was gathered both directly from the chat tool
which logged various features such as typing time,
number of self-edits, i.e. use of the backspace and
delete key and temporal data, as well as the tran-
scripts themselves, which were analysed for lin-
guistic features and frequencies. Additionally the
resulting transcripts were hand coded for clarifica-
tion requests and stance shifts, explained in more
detail below.
3.1 A note on terminology
Turn: For the purpose of this experiment, a turn
constitutes the text relayed in a single message,
meaning what is delineated by the ENTER key.
Intervention Turn (IT): The IT refers to the
turn issued by a speaker which has had a Turn-
initial intervention fragment inserted before the
actual typed message.
Intervention Reply Turn (IRT): The IRT
refers to the next turn issued by the speaker who
receives the Intervention Turn. This is not always
the next sequential turn after the IT, as the speaker
whose turn contained the IT may issues another
turn.
Clarification Requests: The transcripts were
hand coded for Clarification Requests (CR), a
form of repair in which speakers signal a need for
further information, typically due to a lack of full
comprehension of a previous utterance. This was
done by a single annotator, blind, and all labelling
indicating which condition a file belonged to was
removed. CRs were hand labeled in the dataset,
based on Purver et al. (2003) schema, example
provided in Table 1 .
Stance shifts: The transcripts were hand coded
for shifts in stance regarding who to throw off of
Turn 1: P1 you’re wrong or maybe
we are just going by gen-
der stereotypes.. the femi-
nist in me is screaming
IT
Turn 2: P1 haha
Turn 3: P2 what if thats the whole
point
IRT
Turn 4: P1 sorry what if....? CR
Turn 5: P1 susie jumped? CR
Table 1: Example of Reply Turn labelling
the balloon, i.e when a participant changed their
point of view over who to sacrifice or save. There
were seven potential stance states that cover all the
possible combinations of who to save and who to
sacrifice1. This was done by a single annotator,
blind, and all labelling indicating which condition
a file belonged to was removed. A participant’s
stance was carried over to the next turn, unless
it provided new information that contradicted the
previous stance.
3.2 Overview of dataset
Table 2 displays the descriptive data for the turn,
word and character counts for each condition.
Condition
Avg. Control Agreement Disagreement
Turns
by Dyad
86.71 63.17 70.79
Words
by Dyad
587.67 555.58 535.08
Char.
by Dyad
2938 2797 2710
Words
per turn
7.41 9.49 9.11
Table 2: Summary of average typed data per con-
dition
Both intervention conditions result in fewer
overall turns than in the Control condition, but this
was particularly the case, and statistically signifi-
cant, with the Agreement condition (positive and
agreement insertions, such as yes and I agree).
Although the Agreement condition features fewer
1The range of possible stances: 1. Undecided, 2. Save
Susie but undecided on who should die, 3. Save Nick but
undecided on who should die, 4. Save Tom but but undecided
on who should die, 5. Sacrifice Susie (and therefore save the
other two), 6. Sacrifice Nick, 7. Sacrifice Tom.
turns than the Control condition, there are more
words per turn on average in the Agreement con-
dition. A non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test con-
firms a significant overall effect of Condition on
the turns typed in the dialogues (H(2) = 6.34,
p<0.04).2 Subsequent planned pairwise compar-
isons with the Dunns test showed a significant in-
crease in the number of turns per dyad in the Con-
trol condition compared to the Agreement condi-
tion (p<0.05). There is an overall effect of con-
dition on the distribution of average words per
turn, as confirmed by a non-parametric, Kruskal
Wallis test (H(2) = 6.55, p<0.04). Subsequent
planned pairwise comparisons with the Dunns test
showed a significant increase between Agreement
and Control conditions (p<0.03).
3.3 Message construction
Condition Typing Time Self-edits
Control 11850 6.98
Agree 16210 6.97
Disagree 13484 7.51
Table 3: Table depicting averageTyping Time and
number of Self-edits (delete key presses), per turn,
per condition
Table 3 shows the average typing time in mil-
liseconds and the number of self-edits per turn.
Self-edits are represented by the number of times
the delete key is pressed during turn construc-
tion. A non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test finds
an omnibus effect of condition on the number of
self-edits during turn construction (H(2) = 40.92,
p<0.01), with planned pairwise comparison re-
vealing significant difference between the Agree-
ment and Disagreement conditions (p<0.01). An
overall effect of condition on typing time is
confirmed by a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis
test (H(2) = 99.28, p<0.01), with planned pair-
wise comparison revealing significant difference
between the Agreement and Control conditions
(p<0.01).
3.4 Message content
The following tables highlight differences in the
content of the dialogues, such as Clarification Re-
quests and instances of exposed and potential dis-
agreement.
2Throughout we use p<0.05 as our criterion level but re-
port computed probabilities to two decimal places for com-
pleteness.
3.4.1 Clarification Requests
Condition Total Number Mean
of CRs CRs per dyad
Control 10 0.42
Agreement 13 0.54
Disagreement 50 2.08
Table 4: No. of Clarification requests by Condi-
tion
Table 4 shows the number of Clarification Re-
quests by condition. The Disagreement condi-
tion has a significantly higher number of Clarifica-
tion Requests than Control condition and Agree-
ment condition. A non-parametric Kruskal Wal-
lis test confirms an overall effect of Condition on
the number of Clarification Requests in the di-
alogues (H(2) = 12.03, p<0.01). Planned pair-
wise comparison showed a significant increase be-
tween Control and Disagree conditions (p<0.01)
and Agree and Disagree (p<0.02).
3.4.2 Instances of exposed and potential
(dis)agreement
Table 5 shows the frequencies of turn-initial ex-
posed and potential (dis)agreement markers. The
markers included here are the same ones that fea-
ture in the fragments that were artificially inserted
during the experiment.
Turn-
initial
Control
condition
Agreement
condition
Disagreement
condition
Exposed
(dis)agreement
I agree 2 5 10
You’re
right
0 0 0
I disagree 0 0 3
You’re
wrong
0 0 3
Totals: 2 5 16
Yes 170 124 139
No 29 23 35
And 103 51 55
But 119 81 77
Table 5: Table providing frequency data of turn-
initial content of messages relayed during experi-
ment dialogues.
Exposed (dis)agreement is more frequent in
the Disagreement condition. A non-parametric
Kruskal Wallis test shows a significant om-
nibus effect of condition on turn-initial exposed
(dis)agreement (H(2) = 9.74, p<0.01). Sub-
sequent planned pairwise comparisons with the
Dunns test showed a significant increase in the
number of instances of exposed (dis)agreement in
the Disagreement condition compared to the con-
trol condition (p<0.01).
3.5 Deliberation and shifts in stance
The experiment transcripts were also hand labeled
for stance shifts, i.e. when a participant voices a
departure from one held opinion to an alternative
regarding who should jump from the balloon.
Condition Total Median Mean St. Dev.
Control 175 7.5 8.33 3.96
Agree 248 11 10.33 4.88
Disagree 175 6 7.29 4.31
Table 6: Total number of stance state changes and
averages per participant
The total number of state changes and average
per participant by condition are shown in Table 6.
The median number of stance state changes per
participant is significantly effected by condition
(χ(2) = 6.91, p=0.03). A Median Test was con-
ducted as the variance is not approximately equal
across samples, being much larger for the agree-
ment condition. This result suggests that the Dis-
agreement condition tends to reduce the number
of alternatives people will consider and the agree-
ment condition tends to increase it.
There is no correlation between the length of
the conversation (in turns) and the number of state
changes (Kendals Tau = -0.007, p = 0.94), so the
significance is not related to nor skewed by the fact
that the Agreement condition contains longer dia-
logues, i.e. it is not just about how much partici-
pants talk.
4 Discussion
The turn-initial frequency data shows that ex-
posed agreement and disagreement are more com-
mon the Disagreement condition. The is counter
to our Accommodation hypothesis, which antici-
pated that agreement would lead to more agree-
ment while disagreement would engender more
disagreement. Although there are notably zero in-
stances of exposed disagreement in the Agreement
condition, the comparative frequency in the Dis-
agreement condition did not confirm a significant
effect of condition. Furthermore, a third of the in-
stances of turn-initial exposed disagreement in the
Disagreement condition are actually instances of
repair, rather than disagreement. As shown in the
following excerpt from an experiment transcript,
the exposed disagreement is incongruent, jarring
and provokes a repair sequence. The respondent
quotes back the source of trouble, indicated by the
asterisks in the example below, which were falsely
counted as turn-initial disagreement. The artificial
insertions are shown in square brackets:
Example 1
A: Pros of keeping the doctor alive
A: [you’re wrong] cures cancer
B: [no] you’re wrong?*
A: What about?
B: no, I don’t understand what you just
said
B: You’re wrong cures cancer?*
A: The doctor, if still alive will be
about to discover the sure for the ‘most
common types of cancer’
This example demonstrates the disruptive na-
ture of the inserted disagreement fragment; it dis-
rupts the dialogue and is deemed incongruous
enough for participant B to comment on, while
participant A simply carries on with the conver-
sation. This occurred several times in the dataset,
however, only ever with the exposed disagreement
fragments and never with the exposed agreement
fragments. In line with the literature we found that
exposed disagreement is especially problematic
and on one occasion the insertion was so problem-
atic that it was directly referenced and quoted by a
participant, with both participants being alerted to
the intervention.
Example 2
A: imagine how many scientists in the
world
B: you’re wrong theres a lot
A: i’m wrong?
B: what?
A: you said ’you’re wrong theres a lot’
A: [no] what am i wrong about?
The Disagreement condition featured a signifi-
cantly higher number of clarification requests. The
Productive Disagreement hypothesis anticipated
that this would signal additional work being done
by participants trying to more fully understand one
another’s point of view. However, it is possible
that the clarification requests are more clausal clar-
ification than an attempt to understand the content;
this interpretation is supported by the Example 2,
which notably features a high number of clarifica-
tion requests in a very short segment of dialogue,
however, further analysis is needed to confirm this.
The Productive Disagreement hypothesis also
anticipated that the Disagreement condition would
lead to more stance states being considered. The
results show that although there is an effect of con-
dition on the number of different stance states or
scenarios considered during the dialogue, the di-
rectionality was contrary to our predictions. The
insertion of agreement fragments led to more
shifts in stance. This may be due to the particu-
larly marked and direct nature of the exposed dis-
agreement fragments, which may have closed the
discussion down. This would align with the CA
and Politeness Theory literature, as well as Chiu
(2008), which specifies that while polite disagree-
ment may yield more novel contributions, impolite
disagreement is always problematic.
Overall, our results most strongly confirm the
Politeness hypothesis. Insertions of exposed dis-
agreement had a disruptive effect upon the dia-
logues, producing confusion and clarification re-
quests due to their unexpected and incongruous
nature. Conversely, exposed agreement, even
though also inserted randomly, did not disrupt the
dialogue in the same way and were never explic-
itly addressed by a participant. The Disagreement
condition produced significantly more instances
of exposed agreement, which is most easily in-
terpreted in terms of politeness, face and redres-
sive action; with additional exposed disagreement
being introduced into the dialogues, it seems that
participants respond with cooperation and attempt
to redress the potential affronts to face posed by
the inserted fragments. As predicted there were
more self-edits in the Disagreement condition,
suggesting that participants were having to work
harder to respond to the potentially face threaten-
ing insertions. Our results most strongly support
the Politeness hypothesis and confirm that exposed
disagreement is problematic and disruptive in dia-
logue.
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